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INTRODUCTION
Healthcare is one of the sectors in Bulgaria in which structural reforms have 
stalled. One incontestable achievement of the past nine years has been the 
transition from central budget financing of healthcare to a health insurance 
system. The gain, however, has largely been for the budget. Health-service 
users have still not fully felt the advantages of the change. On the contrary, a 
considerable portion of the population has lost access to health services and 
the rest are dissatisfied with the quality of medical assistance. The equipment 
is outdated, the staff not motivated enough, and corruption is prevalent. In the 
first 17 years of the transition, the system lost the advantages of state healthcare, 
namely, universal coverage and access, without tangibly benefiting from the 
advantages of market-based healthcare: more competition and customer choice, 
technological innovation, and higher quality of services.
The ultimately negative balance of results achieved by the healthcare reform is 
evident from the deteriorating general public health indicators. The combination 
of a falling birth rate and a mounting mortality rate, together with the rising 
number of young people migrating from Bulgaria, further aggravate the problem 
with population ageing.
The high mortality rate is largely accounted for by cardiovascular disorders. 
Two-thirds of deaths are due to heart attacks and strokes. These are followed 
by cancer diseases, which are increasing in number at a fast pace. Respiratory 
conditions are the most common reason for hospitalization, with nearly half 
of the cases with lethal outcome in this category being caused by pneumonia. 
Another alarming tendency is the increasing incidence of mental disorders. Since 
they are relatively less likely to cause premature death, they tend to remain 
outside the focus of attention of health statistics in Bulgaria. It is also the reason 
why their high social and economic price is often overlooked.
The number of people with disabilities has increased three times in the years of 
the transition, with the incidence of newly registered cases being twice higher 
than the average rate in the European Union and among the highest worldwide. 
As with mortality, cardiovascular diseases are a major cause of disability.
One important indicator of healthcare effectiveness is the infant mortality rate. At 
the outset of transition, Bulgaria used to rank close to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, ahead of Poland and Hungary. Fifteen years later Bulgaria 
is at the bottom of the rating. In the Balkans, Albania and Romania are the 
only countries with higher infant mortality rates. In this country, the probability 
of a child dying before the age of five is three times higher than in EU-15 
and about twice higher than in the new EU member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe. The most common causes of infant mortality are premature 
births, prenatal complications, respiratory diseases and various infections. The 
years of the transition have also been marked by deterioration of certain health 
indicators reflecting problems typical of low-income countries, such as the spread 
of tuberculosis and hepatitis. 
Yet it should be noted that these health indicators represent mean values, i.e. 
they tend to obscure the critical situation in some regions of the country. The 
mortality rate, including infant mortality, is far higher in the countryside and the 
regions with geographically compact ethnic minority population.  
The deteriorating health status indicators in Bulgaria are in part due to the 
adverse demographic tendencies, as well – falling birth rate, increasing number 
of young people migrating abroad, etc. The chief reason for the poor indicators, 
however, remains the limited access to health services. In this respect, the main 
obstacle to providing generally accessible medical care is posed by the drop in 
incomes and the increasing economic vulnerability of the population combined 
with the transition to a health-insurance system. Poverty and deteriorating health 
are creating a vicious circle where, due to lack of financial means, people are 
left outside the reach of the health service system and in turn, poor health 
undermines their prospects in the labor market and ultimately leads to deepening 
poverty and social exclusion.
The healthcare reform has so far failed to come up with adequate solutions 
to the challenges facing healthcare in Bulgaria. The government has withdrawn 
from health service delivery to concentrate on the management of the health 
insurance system. The existing disease prevention programs largely rely on external 
financing, which makes them projections of international programs rather than 
of the public healthcare agenda in Bulgaria. The high infant mortality rate and 
the increasing incidence of infectious diseases may be attributed to the limited 
scope of immunization programs. The transition from a state-financed healthcare 
system to health insurance has reduced the scope and reach of prophylactics and 
medical assistance, particularly as regards the increasing number of Bulgarians not 
covered by health insurance.
The unemployed and the low-income groups are not the only ones exposed 
to higher health risks. In varying degrees, this applies to society as a whole. 
The liberalization of prices and private enterprise were not accompanied by 
adequate legal and institutional measures to safeguard the rights of employees 
and consumers. This led to increased health risks in the workplace and the 
home. The state is not yet fully effective in implementing work and food safety 
standards, or environmental protection standards, and does not have a clear-cut 
policy for the protection of medicine consumers against monopoly or oligopoly 
prices. The high social and economic stress combined with weaker employee and 
consumer protection have brought about a sharp deterioration of the health status 
and quality of life of a large portion of the population in Bulgaria.
In addition to the social and economic difficulties of the transition, the problems 
with Bulgarian healthcare to a great extent stem from deficiencies in the 
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management of the health system. The present report examines the institutional 
problems and corrupt practices conducive to the poor quality of medical care in 
Bulgaria. The results of the transition from state-financed health system to health 
insurance have been analyzed with a view to identifying the sources of corruption 
risk and their relative weight.
Chapter one deals with the healthcare problems related to poor management. They 
essentially fall into three groups: lack of political will to bring the health reform to 
successful completion; insufficient state funding; and insufficient managerial and 
administrative capacity. These problems provided a fertile breeding ground for 
corrupt practices and non-compliance by health service consumers and providers. 
Chapter two outlines the dimensions and dynamics of corruption in the health 
sector and the most common corrupt practices. Chapter three is concerned with 
the specific driving forces of corruption in the outpatient sector and chapter four, 
in the hospital sector. Chapter five formulates the main conclusions and policy 
recommendations. It also presents a system of indicators for the monitoring and 
assessment of corruption risk in the healthcare sector in Bulgaria.
The Center for the Study of Democracy would like to thank Gergana Kirova, head 
of the Inspectorate Division of the Ministry of Health and Denitsa Sacheva from 
the International Healthcare and Health Insurance Institute for their comments on 
earlier drafts of the report. Responsibility for any errors or omissions rests solely 
with the author. 

1. HEALTHCARE REFORM IN BULGARIA: THE ACQUIRED 
INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
1.1. BELATED AND INCOMPLETE REFORMS
Reforms in the health sector in Bulgaria did not actually begin until ten years after 
the start of the transition to market economy. Moreover, upon their launch in 1999, 
Bulgaria chose a partial restructuring approach, with only outpatient care conceded 
to the private sector. The hospitals remained in the public sector. In fact, even health 
insurance is public since it is mandatory and is managed by the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF).
Under the former system, medical care was provided by polyclinics and hospitals. All 
medical services and necessary medications were free-of-charge and financed by the 
national budget. The flaws of this system are well-known. They are related to the fact 
that central distribution of financial resources and the lack of competition undermine 
the effectiveness of health care and do not offer any incentives for improved 
quality of service. Conversely, competition in the market stimulates providers to 
deliver higher-quality services at lower prices and encourages insurers to offer more 
advantageous insurance plans. Voluntary (private) health insurance is an intrinsic part 
of modern market economies. Here, the consumers and their employers purchase 
health policies from private health insurance companies, which in turn cover partially 
or fully their medical care expenses.
The chief shortcomings of this system are related to certain market drawbacks. Private 
health insurance is unable to automatically achieve the results attainable by an active 
government health policy – high coverage rate of planned immunizations, guaranteed 
access to health services, and protection of at-risk groups (typically remaining out of 
the reach of private insurance). With prophylactics and disease prevention, the public 
benefits outweigh the respective private expenditures, which is sufficient reason for 
financial support by the state. Reducing health risks in society largely depends on the 
access to health services of the more exposed low-income groups. In addition, health 
insurance and the market for health services as a rule require a certain amount 
of government regulation and control in order to safeguard consumer rights and 
guarantee adherence to minimum standards of treatment and service.
For these reasons, many countries opt for a combined system bringing together the 
responsibilities of the state regarding the health policy and the health and social 
protection of the most at-risk groups on the one hand, and the opportunity for 
market-based choice of health-service provider depending on the patient’s ability 
to pay. It remains up to the state to regulate and supervise the market in order to 
ensure definite standards of health service quality and consumer rights protection. 
This includes licensing and control of insurers and accreditation and supervision of 
health establishments. 
The Bulgarian health reform combines public and private responsibilities, too. The 
country has a health-insurance system managed by the National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF), with private outpatient care and public hospital care. The reform, which 
started in 1999, introduced three health service levels. The first one comprises services 
provided by the general practitioners (GPs), who find themselves at the ”entry point”
of the system. They provide initial medical checkups and treatment or refer the 
patients to specialists or hospital. If necessary, the GP can also issue a sick-leave 
certificate for temporary incapacity for work.
The second level comprises medical (and dental) services provided by specialists. 
These fall within the outpatient sector even though the offices of the specialists 
and the specialized laboratories may sometimes be located on the premises of the 
public hospitals. When necessary, they too, can issue referrals to hospital or other 
specialists.
Hospital care constitutes the third level of health services, i.e. the services provided 
by hospitals and dispensaries. The costs of these are covered by the health insurance 
when the patients have been referred by the GP or a specialist. However, the 
number of referrals that a single doctor may issue each month is limited. This leads 
to numerous complaints by patients that their GPs declined to issue such a referral 
or postponed it for the next month because they had exhausted their quota.
1.2. SHORTAGE OF FUNDS
The healthcare reform in Bulgaria was largely motivated by the shortage of public 
funds for health care, which are in the range of 4-5% of GDP (Table 1).
By international comparisons, presented in Table 2, public healthcare expenditures 
in Bulgaria – both per capita and in percentage of GDP – are among the lowest 
in the EU. By expenditures per capita, this country only surpass Romania and by 
Таble 1. Public Healthcare Expenditures in Bulgaria
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Percentage of GDP 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.1
Percentage of total public 
expenditures 
9.7 10.1 10.0 11.3 12.1 11.6 12.1 11.1
Share of health insurance in 
healthcare expenditures (%)
9.9 13.0 35.8 40.6 51.6 63.2 76.1 –
Source: NSI, Ministry of Finance
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share of public healthcare expenditures in GDP, Romania and Latvia. Even in the 
Balkans, under these indicators, we lag behind Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia.
Voluntary private health insurance has still not established itself as an alternative to 
public one. According to the World Health Organization, private health insurance 
funds in this country represent less than 1% of health-care expenditures. In fact, 
the 2-3% of GDP that supplement public health-care expenditures are made 
up by direct extra payments by patients (Table 3). These data do not take in the 
informal (bribe) payments. That is why the actual health-care financing burden 
borne by the patients in Bulgaria is far greater than in the other countries. Since 
patients in Bulgaria pay almost as much as the state in official and unofficial 
payments, one might logically wonder why they are not opting for voluntary 
private health insurance.
The explanation is usually attributed to the fact that private insurance is as yet 
hardly able to compete with public health insurance and cannot offer greater 
coverage and choice of plans. The advantages for the patient taking out a private 
insurance policy in addition to the mandatory health insurance are the broader 
choice of health service providers and reimbursement of prescribed medications 
that may not be covered by public health insurance. So far, in this country, these 
Тable 2. Public Healthcare Expenditures in Bulgaria – 
International Comparison
Public sector 
expenditures
Percentage of GDP*
USD per capita at the average 
annual exchange rate **
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech Republic 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.8 6.5 347 327 373 471 600
Hungary 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.5 6.1 6.0 250 231 258 348 495
Poland 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.5 177 172 210 234 248
Slovakia 5.2 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.1 196 186 193 228 318
Slovenia 5.8 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.7 628 640 683 751 930
Estonia 4.9 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.2 197 170 176 203 282
Latvia 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 114 107 110 129 155
Lithuania 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 4.9 145 148 160 197 267
Bulgaria 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.1 4.3 63 58 69 88 104
Romania 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.4 54 59 65 79 100
Albania 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 35 33 37 41 49
Croatia 7.5 8.1 7.2 6.5 6.5 6.6 333 330 317 325 413
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.1 5.0 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.6 76 58 54 62 85
Serbia and Montenegro 4.1 3.6 – – – – 45 34 54 86 136
Macedonia 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.8 6.0 5.9 98 91 86 107 136
Source: * TransMONEE 2007; **WHR 2006
advantages tend to remain more theoretical than practical. They even decline 
as the NHIF provides increasing opportunities for choice of service provider and 
covers a widening range of medications. Private insurers are not in position to 
offer many different plans. Both private insurers and the NHIF rely on the same 
providers, with the latter depending almost entirely on their contracts with the 
Fund. 
Whereas the benefits of the purchase of private health insurance policy are not 
very substantial, the costs are considerable. First of all, it does not cancel or 
reduce the mandatory health insurance contributions to the NHIF. Secondly, the 
tax incentives for individual health insurance policies are reduced to a deduction 
of up to 10% of the taxable personal income. And thirdly, it may not be so easy 
to get an advantageous individual insurance plan.  The private health insurance 
market in Bulgaria is still not developed enough and caters mainly to corporate 
clients. Additional health insurances, if any, are typically part of the benefit 
packages offered by employers as incentives for their workers and employees.
The advantages for employers taking out private health insurance policies for 
their employees are not too big either. For tax purposes, insurance expenditures 
are treated as social expenditures that are tax-free up to a certain amount per 
person per month.1 As an extra incentive, some insurance companies try to attract 
new corporate clients by offering to take on the mandatory medical checkups 
of employees as well as to monitor workplace safety in addition to the health 
insurance.
In sum, the state has placed considerable limitations on the development of 
the private health insurance market. These restraints lead to the withdrawal of 
insurers from the market and reduce competition. Instead of taking measures to 
stimulate this sector, the policy concerning Bulgarian healthcare treats the market 
as underdeveloped and ineffective and is instead aimed at stricter regulations 
and quality control of the services provided by NHIF. There is a call for a radical 
change in the existing public-private partnership schemes.
1 In 2007, this amount is 60 Leva.
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Таble 3. Public and Private Healthcare Expenditures in Bulgaria
Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Percentage of GDP 6.0 6.2 7.2 7.9 7.5 7.7
Of which: public (%) 65.4 59.2 56.1 56.6 54.5 55.8
private (%) 34.6 40.8 43.9 43.4 45.5 44.2
Of which: out-of-pocket (%) 99.0 99.0 99.2 98.4 98.4 –
Source: WHR 2006 (up to 2003), Health Systems in Transition: Bulgaria 2007 on 2004 
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1.3. UNSTABLE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK HINGED 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal framework of health sector management in this country has been drastically 
changed in the past 9 years (see Box 1). Health sector financing is regulated by 
the Law on the National Budget of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Law on the 
NHIF Budget. The secondary and tertiary legislation comprises numerous decrees 
and ordinances by the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Health, and the other 
agencies dealing with various health hazards and the protection of public health. 
The wide-ranging and complex legal framework is undergoing constant changes in 
the process of reform and harmonization of the Bulgarian legislation with that of 
the EU. The Law on Health Insurance alone has gone through 44 amendments 
in the past 9 years. These continuous changes have rarely been accompanied by 
assessment of the implementation of the regulations. Neither have they been taking 
into account the capacity of the administration and the judicial system to ensure 
effective enforcement. Thus a great many loopholes have emerged due to vertical 
and horizontal inconsistencies between various components of the legal framework.2
This has placed serious challenges before the synchronization of reform efforts and 
the relations between the different stakeholders. What is more, it has created 
conditions conducive to abuse and corruption on the part of the administration. 
The bureaucratic chaos in healthcare can in part be attributed precisely to the 
excessive and inconsistent law-making in the years of the health reform.
2 Vertical inconsistencies are found between primary and secondary legislation, while horizontal 
ones are those between the rules within the different health and public sectors subject to 
regulation.
• Law on Health (2004), amended 16 times, succeeding the Law on Public Health (1973), amended 23 times 
between 1991 and 2003.
• Law on Health Insurance (1998), amended 44 times
• Law on Healthcare Establishments (1999), amended 22 times
• Law on Medications and Pharmacies in Human Medicine (1995), amended 25 times
• Law on Control on Narcotic Substances and Precursors (1999), amended 11 times
• Law on Foods (1999), amended 12 times
• Law on Healthy and Safe Work Conditions (1997), amended 13 times
• Law on Professional Organizations of Physicians and Dentists (1998), amended 7 times
• Law on Professional Organizations of Medical Nurses (2005), amended 4 times
• Law on Organ, Tissue and Cell Transplantation (2003), amended 2 times
• Law on Blood, Blood Donation and Transfusion (2003), amended 3 times
Box 1. Legal Framework
Source: Ministry of Health
POLICY PRIORITIES
The priorities in the health sector are laid down in about 25 national health 
strategies and programs (Box 2). They are concerned with the problems perceived 
as the gravest health risks: AIDS, tuberculosis, measles and rubella, cardiovascular 
diseases, early diagnostics of cancer, osteoporosis, mental health, suicide prevention, 
drugs and cigarettes, food safety, and transplantations. Most of these programs 
and strategies are part of international projects and campaigns. According to the 
draft National Health Strategy of 2006, the budget funds allocated to disease 
prevention programs amounted to BGN 18 million, which constituted less than 
1% of the annual health-care budget in 2006.3
These priorities fall within the powers of the Ministry of Health but other institutions 
have important responsibilities, as well. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 
is chiefly responsible for the implementation of work safety standards, while the 
Ministry of the Environment and Ecology is responsible for the implementation of 
environmental protection standards.
In addition, there exist more than ten specialized agencies with educational, 
informational, and control functions. Many of them were created in the past 16 
years within various donor programs. From the present point of view and because of 
the lack of real restructuring, most of them seem a necessary but costly contribution 
to the health reform the benefits of which have not yet taken full effect.
3 National Health Strategy 2007-2012, p.17
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• National Health Strategy 2007 – 2012
• National Strategy on Supply of Medicines 2004
• National Program for Development of Invasive Cardiology, 2002 – 2008
• Narcotic Dependency Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation, 2001 – 2005
• National Strategy and Working Program for Prophylactic Oncological Screening, 2001 – 2006
• National Program for Psychic Health Reform 2001 – 2010; Mental Health Policy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
2004 – 2012
• National Program on Nephrology and Dialysis Treatment 
• National Program for Control of Tuberculosis, 2004 – 2006
• National Program to Reduce Tobacco Smoking, 2002 – 2006 
• National Program for Suicide Prevention 
• National Environmental Action Plan – Health
• HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Program, 2001 – 2007
• National Program to Reduce Osteoporosis, 2006 – 2010
• National Program for the Elimination of Measles and Rubella, 2005 – 2010
• Food Safety Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2000
Box 2. Policy Strategies and Programs
Source: Ministry of Health
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QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Health service quality management relies almost entirely on all-embracive 
administrative control rather than on adequate financial incentives. Moreover, the 
control is concentrated largely at entry. Its main instruments are the accreditation 
of the healthcare providers and the medical standards.
The accreditation of healthcare establishments aims at ensuring minimum 
equipment and qualification standards necessary for the delivery of the respective 
services covered by NHIF. These requirements are stipulated in the Ordinance on 
the Criteria, Indicators, and Method of Accreditation of Healthcare Establishments 
with the Law on Healthcare Establishments. The process of accreditation, however, 
is not in position to act as a filter at the entry point to the system – in practice, 
nearly all of the old and ineffective hospitals and medical centers obtained 
accreditation. One of the reasons is that, in a large part of the country, coverage 
and access to medical care matter more than quality. Another reason is that local 
political and social priorities usually outweigh quality concerns.
In addition to accreditation, quality in the health sector is regulated by 24 
medical standards of service by group of disease, which lay down in detail the 
requirements concerning medical equipment, the necessary medical staff and 
qualification; contain comprehensive definitions of the various syndromes covered 
by the respective standard, as well as the respective medical interventions.
In sum, quality management is heavily dependent on strict and exhaustive 
regulatory requirements and control, which involves significant administrative 
costs. Moreover, the money reimbursed by NHIF is not conditional on the quality 
of the services delivered. Thus, once they obtain accreditation, the medical 
practices and hospitals have no motivation whatsoever to invest in human 
resource development, new technologies, or other improvements that would 
enhance the quality of medical care. The system has been designed with a view 
to ensuring a uniform minimum standard level.
At the same time, its implementation is still not effective enough because neither 
the Ministry of Health nor NHIF have the necessary administrative capacity to 
impose sanctions or refuse accreditation to health establishments in regions with 
limited coverage and access, where the problems with the quality of medical 
care are most critical. This system, hinging on control and sanctions, yet lacking 
the capacity to apply administrative coercion, places decision-makers in a vicious 
circle where the ever-increasing requirements and control lower the level of 
compliance with the regulations on the part of the physicians and managers in 
the health sector, and the mutual trust and consideration between the state, 
medical specialists, and patients grow ever more fragile.
HUMAN AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL 
As a result of the above-outlined weaknesses in the management of the health 
sector, it is weighed down by worn-out and obsolete equipment and facilities, 
poor maintenance, ineffective use of resources, and outdated technologies for 
diagnosis and treatment. The number of hospital beds has been reduced (see 
Tables 8 and 9 below), while the average annual bed occupancy per patient (in 
days) has increased. This, however, has not led to significant cost optimization 
since the reduction of the number of hospital beds did not entail reduction of 
the rooms and facilities for the treatment of one patient.
In terms of the physicians per capita indicator, Bulgaria has always maintained 
a high record. Yet, there are a great many vacancies, particularly for doctors 
with a specialty. The oversupply and the concentration of physicians in the cities 
are causing a twofold problem – low remuneration and poor motivation of 
medical workers, on the one hand, and poor regional coverage, on the other. An 
additional problem is posed by the shortage of nurses. It is due to the migration 
of nurses to Europe and the small number of specialized colleges. The nurse:
doctor ratio in Bulgaria is about twice lower than in the rest of Europe and the 
prospects for its optimization in the near future are not too bright.
Overall, although much has been done and significant funds have been spent, 
the results of the reforms fall very much short of the prevalent expectations of 
patients and physicians alike. If, from the consumers’ viewpoint, the reform was 
supposed to replace the old state healthcare system with a health-insurance 
system guaranteeing access and coverage together with increased competition 
among service providers and greater choice for patients, then this goal has not 
been attained.  Alternatively, from the perspective of the providers (physicians and 
managers in the health sector) the reform was to establish the ”money follows 
the patient” principle, i.e. the distribution of public funds was to take place on 
the basis of the number of patients, activities carried out, and results achieved, 
and this goal has not been attained either.
In sum, in terms of the results, and still less in terms of the spending to date, the 
reform in public healthcare management can hardly be evaluated as satisfactory. 
The total amount of funds allocated to health is not so small by international 
standards, but a relatively large proportion is made up by direct individual 
payments for health services, for the most part under the table. Bulgarians pay 
more (health-insurance contributions, formal and informal payments) than the 
citizens of other countries in transition, moreover, for poorer quality services. 
The present system ignores investment in new technologies and the continuing 
education of medical specialists. Preventive medicine remains outside the reach 
of the restructuring effort and is still under-funded and poorly managed. Last but 
not least, access to medical services for the most at-risk social groups is limited 
and inequitable.
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2. CORRUPTION IN HEALTHCARE
2.1. LEVEL AND SPREAD
Bulgarian society demonstrates high sensitivity to the problems of healthcare 
and corruption in general. Citizens traditionally rank them among the foremost 
challenges of Bulgarian transition. In 2007, corruption came out as the top 
problem faced by Bulgaria while healthcare was ranked sixth, nearly on a par 
with problems such as crime and poverty (Figure 1).
The international and national corruption assessment indexes reveal a tendency 
towards decline in petty and administrative corruption in Bulgaria in the past 
five years. Healthcare deviates from the general trend and even marks a rise 
in some respects. The Vitosha Research Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) 
shows a twofold increase in the proportion of citizens citing the health service 
sector among those where corruption is most prevalent: from 20% in 2002 to 
40% in 2007. This places healthcare in the third position, after customs and the 
Figure 1. Which are the top three problems faced by Bulgaria?
(% of respondents who cited the respective problem)
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Source: Vitosha Research
judicial system. In the latest ranking they surpassed the bodies of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs as the institutions most affected by corruption. The public has 
a similar assessment of the spread of corruption among physicians. Two-thirds 
of the citizens believe all or nearly all doctors are involved in corrupt practices 
(Table 5). Under this indicator, doctors follow immediately behind customs officers 
and law-enforcement and justice representatives, and are ranked ahead of tax 
officials, the political elite, ministers, and mayors.
Naturally, the conclusions about the actual level of corruption drawn on the 
basis of the assessments of the public should be taken with certain reservations. 
In many cases they may reflect real achievements in the fight against corruption 
in a particular area, the exposure of more cases, better anticorruption control 
within a given institution, as well as rising public intolerance of these corrupt 
practices. All of this can increase the values of public assessments of the rate of 
corruption in the short term, whereas the actual incidence of corrupt practices 
may have different dynamics. For this reason, the indicators should not be used 
to draw definitive conclusions about the scope of corruption. They rather reveal 
the public’s attitude to the problem and its perceived importance, and it is in 
this sense that they are useful tools in anticorruption policy-making. They show 
that prevention and counteraction of corruption in healthcare are among the top 
priorities on the Bulgarian anticorruption agenda.
Таble 4. Where in Bulgaria is corruption most widespread?
(% of those citing the respective institution)
2002/10 2003/10 2004/11 2005/11 2007/01
In customs 30.4 49.5 50.9 52.6 63.1
In justice administration 28.5 42.0 40.8 43.0 49.8
In healthcare 20.6 27.8 35.2 35.1 39.6
In the Ministry of Interior (MoI) system (incl. 
Traffic Police)
19.9 33.9 33.8 32.3 39.4
Among the political elite 30.3 26.1 16.9 16.4 33.0
Source: Vitosha Research
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A more reliable indicator about the actual dynamics and spread of corrupt practices 
is the patients’ shared personal experience. This indicator reflects what portion 
of the population has actually experienced requests for undue compensation in 
their contacts with doctors. Revealingly, by respondents’ self-reported experience, 
doctors head the CMS ranking, having moved up from the fourth to the first 
place over the past 5 years (Table 6). Of course, this does not necessarily mean 
that physicians are more corrupt than the remaining groups in the ranking. The 
reported higher incidence of corruption pressure may result from more frequent 
interaction with doctors than with customs or police officers.4 However, what 
the results definitely imply is that corruption in healthcare affects more people 
than corruption in any other occupational group, i.e. it has the strongest adverse 
impact felt throughout society.
Таble 5. Assessments of the Spread of Corruption in Various 
Occupational Groups
(Percentage of those who answered ”all” or ”nearly all” are involved in 
corruption) 
2002/10 2003/10 2004/11 2005/11 2007/01
Customs officers 79.2 74.5 70.3 71.8 78.0
Judges 63.0 57.3 56.1 59.3 67.5
Prosecutors 63.0 55.7 55.3 57.1 66.9
Lawyers 62.3 55.8 54.9 54.7 64.5
Police officers 59.6 59.2 58.8 56.1 65.4
Physicians 54.9 52.9 55.4 54.5 64.1
Tax officials 58.0 49.3 49.9 53.5 63.8
MPs 56.2 54.5 50.7 53.4 63.8
Political and party leaders 54.0 47.6 50.5 51.6 62.7
Ministers 50.8 52.6 45.4 51.1 61.7
Investigators 57.5 49.2 51.7 50.5 60.3
Mayors and municipal councilors 48.3 43.4 47.0 47.5 58.0
Ministry officials 48.3 40.1 42.6 44.4 50.8
Municipal officials 49.1 36.5 44.3 43.4 43.8
University teachers 33.4 36.5 33.1 29.9 32.3
NGO representatives 21.4 22.3 23.7 26.6 31.7
Teachers 13.9 11.0 14.0 14.4 15.7
Source: Vitosha Research
4 In this sense, a more accurate indicator would be the percentage of those who have been asked 
for money or favors out of the respondents who have interacted with the respective group, but 
such a breakdown would require a very large sample.
2.2. TYPES OF CORRUPT PRACTICES
The most common corrupt practices in healthcare involve offering gifts or 
payments beyond the officially established fee rates. Unlike other types of ”petty 
corruption”, here the end users of health services are subjected to corruption 
pressure leaving them little freedom of choice as to their corruption behavior. This 
is a typical instance when the bribe giver is a victim rather than an accomplice 
or beneficiary. The patients pay bribes in order to ensure the proper quality 
of service to which they are in fact entitled under their health insurance. This 
is what makes healthcare one of the areas where victimization surveys are an 
effective diagnostic tool. Figure 2 presents the most common corrupt practices in 
healthcare.
Таble 6. Personally Experienced Corruption Pressure by Occupational Group
(% of those citing the respective group in answer to the question ”If, in the 
course of the past year, you have been asked for something (money, gift or 
favor) in order to have a problem of yours solved, the request came from:...”)
2002/10 2003/10 2004/11 2005/11 2007/01
Doctors 20.3 16.6 22.5 26.2 30.1
Police officers 22.3 13.9 22.2 27.7 26.7
Customs officers 19.4 15.3 13.8 22.1 23.8
Lawyers 26.5 13.8 16.5 22.0 18.9
Prosecutors 12.3 4.2 5.1 1.2 14.3
Investigators 8.3 9.6 5.0 1.3 13.3
Judges 16.6 8.5 5.8 3.4 11.7
Ministry officials 5.6 8.2 6.3 8.2 11.5
Tax officials 4.2 5.9 5.1 8.1 11.3
University teachers 11.9 16.6 12.6 15.3 10.7
University employees 5.6 9.0 9.0 10.1 9.8
Mayors and municipal councilors 5.3 3.3 6.6 6.5 9.8
Municipal officials 10.9 6.4 10.3 9.5 9.5
Politicians and political party leaders 7.1 4.1 5.0 2.5 7.7
Teachers 7.4 5.6 6.2 6.0 4.0
NGO representatives 5.0 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.5
Source: Vitosha Research
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The idea is currently being advanced that informal payments in the health sector 
do not constitute a corrupt practice as long as they follow, rather than precede, 
the service delivery. In other words, if a patient pays the surgeon 300-400 Leva 
after the operation, it is an expression of gratitude rather than a bribe since it 
is entirely up to the patient whether to pay or not and the doctor does not 
have any levers of corruption pressure. We shall not go into the legal arguments 
that the time when it is obtained is irrelevant to determining an undue gain. 
Moreover, experience shows that some doctors can be quite firm in defining the 
Figure 2. What was the specific purpose or occasion for the 
provision of gifts/favors/payments beyond the official fees?
(% of those who gave the respective answer) 
���������
����������������������
�����������������������
����������������������������
����������������
����������������������
����������������������
������������������
������������������
����������������������������������
�������������������
����������������������
���������������������������������
����������������������������
�������������������
���������������������������
������������������
����������������
����������������������
������������������
�������������������������
������������������������������
�������������������
����������������������
����������������������
����������������������
����������������������
�������
����������������������
���������������������
���������������������
������������������
�����������������������
��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���� ���� ���� ����
�������������������������������������������
����
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
����
���
����
���
���
����
���
���
����
���
���
�����������������������
����������
Source: Vitosha Research, 2005
anticipated ”proportions” of gratitude and may even refuse to accept less than 
they expected.  
In practice, however, the physicians who expect extra compensation for their efforts 
(and all or nearly all of them do, according to two-thirds of the representative 
sample) rarely leave it up to the patients’ sense of gratitude. They either use as 
a pretext costly medical procedures and supplies or refer the patients to their 
private practices for diagnosis and treatment. Under the conditions of artificially 
maintained market deficit in high-quality specialized services, those in need have 
to resort to connections and string-pulling in order to get access to good doctors 
in which case direct cash payment, at tacitly agreed rates, is the norm rather 
than the exception.
Not all corrupt practices in the health sector, however, can be assigned to this 
type. There exist other forms related not so much to the use of health services 
as the exercise of certain social security and health insurance rights such as 
temporary incapacity for work (sick-leave certificates), permanent disability, and 
vocational rehabilitation. With these types of corruption, the patients may be 
victims of extortion but likewise accomplices to the doctors for the purpose of 
unduly profiting (the gain by far exceeding the value of the bribe or gift) from 
social security and pension funds. 
In another type of corrupt practices in healthcare, the interests of the patients are 
indirectly affected while they are not directly involved in a corruption transaction. 
It includes corrupt practices in the medicine market and in the financing of 
hospitals by NHIF, administrative corruption related to the supervision of health 
service providers, as well as to the implementation of hygiene and work safety 
standards in regulating commercial activity. These types of corruption may involve 
various other participants and stakeholders in the economy of healthcare and 
may reach the higher ranks of government. Thus for instance, irregular practices 
in the trade in medicines fall within ”petty corruption” when distributors are 
giving commissions or bribes to physicians in order to have them prescribe their 
medications; or within the area of public procurement corruption, when supplies 
to hospitals are involved; or even, corruption in the high ranks of power, when 
it comes to approving the lists of medications reimbursed by NHIF and the 
centralized public procurement of medicines and medical products.
Sociological surveys among patients indicate that the big problems with corruption 
in the health system are related to hospital treatment. In a survey conducted 
by ASSA-M sociological agency in 2006, the largest proportion of respondents 
perceived corruption as most prevalent in the hospital sector (Table 7).
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While of a more limited scope and variety, the informal provision of money and 
gifts is common in the outpatient sector, as well, despite the prevalence of private 
practices. According to the 2005 survey by Vitosha Research on corruption in 
healthcare, 32% of the respondents had given money or gifts to their GPs, and 
18% had resorted to this kind of ”stimulation” of specialists in the outpatient 
sector (Figure 3). The next two paragraphs consider the preconditions for corrupt 
practices in the two sub-sectors of healthcare.
Figure 3. To whom have you made unregulated gifts and payments?
(% of those who gave the respective answer)
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Source: Vitosha Research, 2005
Таble 7. Assessment of the Spread of Corruption 
in Healthcare
(% of respondents who perceived corruption as 
widespread in the respective sector)
In hospitals – performance of surgical operations 47.9%
In hospitals – birth delivery assistance 39.5%
In hospitals – daily care 28.9%
In hospitals – hospital admission 24.8%
Among specialty doctors in outpatient care 19.5%
Among GPs 9.9%
Source: ASSA-M, 2006 N = 1028

3. CORRUPTION IN THE OUTPATIENT CARE
The lower rate of corruption in outpatient care compared to the hospital sector 
is due to the more advanced process of restructuring of the former. This does 
not mean that the restructuring has progressed as far as to minimize corruption 
risks. The outpatient sub-sector still suffers from excessive regulation, ineffective 
promotion of quality improvement, and inadequate coverage. Accordingly, the 
corruption risks and practices are largely related to the shortage of GPs and 
the existing limits on specialist and hospital referrals. Money or gifts to GPs are 
typically provided in connection with home visits and the issuing of referrals. 
The purpose of the bribes may also concern the issuing of sick-leave certificates. 
Insofar as paid sick leave is covered by the General Illness and Maternity Fund, 
the physicians do not lose anything out of this; on the contrary, they only gain 
in patients and appointments. Another relatively frequent corrupt practice in the 
outpatient sector is to prescribe particular medications or refer patients to specific 
pharmacies for a commission or other ”incentives” from the respective medical 
retailer. 
The question why the outpatient sector needs extra ”under-the-table” payments 
in order to provide better-quality services calls for closer investigation of the 
organization of outpatient service delivery, of the ways in which it is controlled 
by the state, and whether doctors are getting adequate remuneration for their 
work.
3.1. CORRUPTION RISKS AND PRACTICES AMONG GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 
Primary medical care is provided entirely by general practitioners (GPs) who 
conclude individual or collective contracts with NHIF.5 The number of GPs 
exceeds 6,000, with most of them working in individual private practices (Table 8). 
GPs may provide services either as natural persons (freelance GPs) or in the 
capacity of sole proprietors. 
5 The system of contracts between GPs and NHIF entered into effect on July 1, 2000.
GPs are paid for their services by the NHIF and by the patients. The consumer 
fee paid by patients for each visit amounts to 1% of the minimum monthly 
salary.6 There have lately been increasing calls to abolish this fee as a social 
measure. What is actually being overlooked is that it is not just a supplement to 
the income of doctors in the outpatient sector, but also a filter of sorts for limiting 
unwarranted visits and reducing waiting lines in GPs’ and specialists’ practices.
The payment received by GPs from the NHIF is based on the number of patients 
and activities performed. In the past 7 years it has been the goal of the reform 
to modify the initial financing scheme where the bulk (85%) of GP remuneration 
was a function of the number of registered patients to one where most of the 
amount would be earned on the basis of activities actually performed. Currently, 
the latter account for about 40% of NHIF payment to GPs.
The amount received on the basis of the number of patients still makes up about 
60% of the total monthly sum doctors receive from NHIF. All health-insured 
citizens are obliged to choose a personal GP and to register with him/her. 
Initially, in order to conclude a contract with the NHIF, physicians had to have 
a minimum of 800 registered patients and there was likewise an upper limit on 
Таble 8. Outpatient Health Establishments in Bulgaria
Outpatient health establishments
2004 2005 2006
Number Beds Number Beds Number Beds
Primary medical aid dispensaries
Individual practices
Group practices
5,897
224
5,186
216
4,296
202
Primary dental care dispensaries
Individual practices 
Group practices
7,758
142
7,483
146
5,504
131
Specialized medical care dispensaries
Individual practices 
Group practices
6,422
124
5,623
116
2,342
91
Specialized dental care dispensaries
Individual practices 
Group practices
152
1
132
1
Medical center 454 440 495 518 492 568
Dental center 56 4 53 4 51 4
Medical-and-dental center 44 21 47 29 46 20
Diagnostic and consultation service 107 204 105 268 102 246
Independent diagnostic and technical 
laboratories
828 854 881
Source: National Health Information Center 
6 In 2007, with the minimum salary set at 180 Leva, the fee is 1.80 Leva.
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the number of patients. These limitations were subsequently dropped. The Fund 
differentiates between patients with chronic diseases (dispensarized patients) and 
the rest, who are divided into age groups: aged 65 and over; under 18; at an 
active age of 18 to 65. For each patient NHIF pays an amount set annually 
in the National Framework Agreement. For 2007, the amounts for the different 
patient groups were BGN 1.25, 1.09, 1.00, and 0.72, respectively. These sums 
are determined in view of the varying amount of work and frequency of visits to 
the personal GP. Yet, the need for such a differentiation is debatable since the 
consumer fee is supposed to compensate the doctors for the greater workload 
associated with the elderly and dispensarized patients. 
Activity-based payment covers prophylactic tests of children or immunizations 
(these fall within the National Child Health Program), maternity consultations, one 
prophylactic checkup a year for the patients over 18 years of age, or incidental 
visits by health-insured patients who are not registered with the respective GP 
(temporary residents, visitors, etc). The amounts paid for examinations are 2 to 5 
times higher than those paid by NHIF on a monthly basis for the various groups 
of patients. The doctors receive additional remuneration if they open a practice in 
areas with a shortage of medical personnel or in remote and hard-of-access regions.
Despite the financial incentives, the problems with the unequal coverage and low 
service quality have still not been addressed. The chief managerial tool employed 
by the government to achieve more balanced coverage is the National Health 
Map (NHM). It features the desired distribution of medical staff by district. 
Since 2005, the Map has rather been a nominal instrument since it has not 
been updated and neither has its implementation progress been monitored.7 The 
latest published reports on NHM implementation indicate that the deviations 
from the indicators range from 67% for Razgrad District to 128% for Sofia. The 
average number of patients registered with a single personal GP was 1,472. In 
some north-east districts such as Turgovishte and Razgrad, the average number 
exceeded 2,000, whereas in Sofia and Pleven, for example, it was under 1,300. 
In practice, most medical resources are concentrated in the cities and university 
centers. In the under-populated regions that are also characterized by the lowest 
rates of employment and health-insurance coverage there is a shortage not only 
of specialists, but also of GPs. The special financial incentives provided by NHIF 
are clearly insufficient to make up for the fewer patients and activities that form 
the basis of doctors’ remuneration. The number of vacant practices was indeed 
significantly reduced from 1,200 at the outset of the reform to about 300 five 
years later. The differences in earnings and the shortage of doctors in some areas, 
however, remains the main challenge facing the health system in Bulgaria. These 
differences are, naturally, far more pronounced in the field of specialized medical 
services.
The unresolved problems with the coverage and access to medical services 
make the declared guidelines for the reform in healthcare towards greater 
7 The current National Health Map was adopted by Decision No 429 of the Council of Ministers 
of June 16, 2003 (Promulgated in State Gazette No 57/ 24.06.2003; amend. No 102/21.11.2003; 
amend. No45/31.05.2005. The last amendment dates back to May 2005 and the latest 
implementation report, to 2004).
consumer choice and competition relevant only in the big cities. Since service 
quality cannot improve under the pressure of competition, incentives assume 
primary importance. At present, GPs receive extra financial compensation in 
order to register more retired patients, to pay special attention to children and 
prophylactics during pregnancy, and generally to increase the number of visits by 
patients, because of the consumer fee. They cannot afford to be too scrupulous 
about issuing sick-leave certificates because they risk losing some of their patients, 
particularly the ones insured on the basis of their full salary, such as public 
administration employees, for example. The personal GPs are also motivated to 
prescribe more expensive medications if they are covered by NHIF. In some 
cases, the doctors may have additional reasons to do so – special promotional 
schemes offered by medical manufacturers and suppliers including commissions 
for the physicians for each prescription. However, they do not have particular 
financial encouragement to improve medical service quality or the health status 
of their patients. These would probably be difficult to measure and thus, the 
NHIF has not adopted any financial motivation instruments in this respect. 
Similarly, NHIF does not allocate any funds for stimulating investments in new 
technologies and professional training. As a result, such expenditures are highly 
limited, particularly in regions with little elasticity of demand, i.e. where patients 
are unable to change their medical service provider and switch to another.
In the absence of competition, the regulatory standards constitute important 
instruments for safeguarding patients’ rights. Their purpose is to only admit in 
the market health service providers who have attained a minimum threshold in 
terms of the level of equipment and qualification. The standards also define the 
interventions performed by physicians. But modern primary medical care calls 
for a more adequate system of financial incentives, with increased share of the 
indicators of individual productivity and results achieved in determining the size 
of GP remuneration. Furthermore, if it is a health policy priority to actually 
improve the health status of the population rather than increase the number of 
visits to personal GPs, it is necessary to stimulate prophylactic activities, including 
immunizations. GPs ought to be encouraged by NHIF or the central budget on 
the basis of their contribution and results in implementing the national health 
priorities. They otherwise stand to gain more from the deterioration than from 
the improvement of the nation’s health.
3.2. CORRUPTION IN SPECIALIZED OUTPATIENT CARE
The sector of specialized medical care was significantly restructured and has been 
taken over entirely by private individual and group practices. Most polyclinics in 
the towns were transformed into Diagnostic-and-Consultation Centers (DCC) and 
medical (dental) centers rented out by the municipalities to specialists and GPs 
at relatively low rental rates. The individual practices exceed 2,300, and group 
practices number 91. In addition, there are 492 medical centers, 102 DCC and 
881 laboratories (see Table 8 above).
Despite the progress made, coverage in the sector of specialized care is more 
unequal and access to specialists, more difficult than to personal GPs. The 
shortage of specialists is greatest in the districts of Silistra, Razgrad, and Russe, 
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where one specialist serves 2,000 insured persons. By comparison, in Sofia, this 
indicator is more than three times lower, with 600 insured persons per specialist. 
These enormous regional discrepancies include the complete lack of certain 
specialties in the countryside. In fact, about 80% of the contracts concluded with 
NHIF cover about one-third of medical specialties. Access to specialty services 
such as surgery, cardiology, pediatrics, endocrinology, psychiatry, and dermato-
venereology is far below the indicators laid down in the National Health Map 
for the regions of Razgrad, Silistra, Smolyan, and Shumen.8
Similar to GPs, specialists may work on a freelance basis or be employed by the 
respective medical centers. The chief source of financing is NHIF. Payment by the 
Fund is based on the number of visits. According to the current National Framework 
Agreement between the Fund and the physicians, most of the specialized services 
are reimbursed at a rate of 12 Leva per first-time examination, half of that 
amount for the second examination, and no reimbursement of subsequent visits. 
The highly specialized and laboratory services are subject to a comprehensive 
tariff included in the National Framework Agreement. The number of reimbursable 
repeat examinations by a single specialist may not exceed half of the number 
of first-time examinations conducted by him/her. Thus, NHIF assumes that on 
average half of the insured patients actually need a second visit to a specialist.9
In addition to this restriction, the access to specialized services is also limited by 
the upper bound on the number of referrals that may be issued by a GP or a 
specialist each month.
Such regulatory constraints on reimbursement of specialized medical services 
by NHIF have the effect of a ration system. As any other deficit-based system, 
it is inevitably conducive to corruption and unregulated payments in order to 
overcome the limitations. Patients’ and press reports, indicate that GPs and 
specialists typically exhaust their quotas of referrals by the middle of the month 
and then postpone patient referrals to specialists to the beginning of the next 
month. The problem is that this ”deficit” may not always be genuine but result 
from deliberate corruption pressure by doctors who wish to profit from the NHIF-
generated shortage of specialized services.
Even if they manage to obtain a referral by using connections or offering some 
favors, should the insured patients need a second appointment with the specialist, 
they have to pay again. Thus, after the first examination, the cost of the visits 
is borne by the patients, who ultimately stop seeing the specialists and interrupt 
the treatment. If a good specialist is able to reach the upper limit with first-time 
examinations alone, he/she would have no motivation whatsoever to follow up 
on the prescribed treatment unless the patient covers the subsequent expenses. 
This practice increases the total sum paid for medical services and is more 
likely to lead to higher hospitalization rates than to address the problem in the 
outpatient sector, where treatment costs are lower.
8 Ministry of Health, Report on the Public Health Status at the Onset of the 21st Century. Health 
Reform Analysis, Sofia, August 2004.
9 The pediatricians are an exception and are entitled to reimbursement by NHIF of second 
examinations up to the number of first-time ones.
Such efficiency loss is evident in connection with some specialized interventions 
assigned to the hospitals although they can and used to be performed in the 
outpatient sector. One such example is the transfer of certain types of biopsy 
from specialized to hospital care. This is rather an instrument for the financing of 
hospitals (directing insurance reimbursements to the public sector) than a means 
of optimization of health expenditures.
Finally, the application of universal rates by NHIF fails to take into account 
the varying costs of the wide range of specialized services and examinations. 
It encourages the provision of cheap, labor-intensive services instead of high-
technology ones. Furthermore, it exposes reimbursement schemes to constant 
pressure from physicians, thus increasing transaction costs of the tripartite 
agreements.
However, detailed differentiation is not a cheap or stable solution either. It 
would be better to adopt instead clear-cut and transparent rules for additional 
payments by patients. It would hardly place a greater burden on them than the 
current practice of covert payments. The effect may even be reversed with the 
development of the additional health insurance policy market.
In conclusion, the sector of outpatient care relies largely on excessive regulation 
and administrative control, which pushes physicians to sidestep the rules and 
undermines the mutual trust between the state and health-service providers. The 
National Framework Agreement is usually finalized late in the year and thus 
doctors for a long time provide services without knowing how these will be 
remunerated. All of this constitutes a fertile breeding ground for corrupt practices 
and interactions, with the inflated medical bills covered out of the pockets of 
the insured.
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4. CORRUPTION IN THE HOSPITAL SECTOR
Compared to outpatient care, the restructuring efforts in the hospital sector practically 
derailed. It is hardly surprising that it is marked by the highest concentration of 
corruption risks and practices. The sector comprises in excess of 300 hospitals and 
dispensaries (Table 9). At the outset of the reform in 2000, all of them were transformed 
into state and municipality-owned public companies. About 20 university hospitals 
and national health establishments became entirely state-owned. In addition, the state 
retained the majority share (51%) in all 28 district hospitals. The remaining 49% were 
divided among the municipalities in the respective districts. Another 102 hospitals are 
completely municipality-owned. The number of private hospitals is 45, with 1,565 
beds, which constitutes a mere 3% of the total number of hospital beds in the sector. 
According to the draft National Health Strategy of 2006, up to at least 2013, hospital 
privatization is not among the priorities of the health reform.
Таble 9. Health Establishments and Number of Beds
2004 2005
Number Beds Number Beds
Total 306 47,709 262 45,537
General hospitals, incl.:
For active treatment
For extended treatment, follow-up care, and physical therapy
127
126
1
29,665
29,545
120
125
125
–
29,270
29,270
–
Specialty hospitals, incl.:
For active treatment
For follow-up care and extended treatment 
Extended treatment, follow-up care, and physical therapy
For physical therapy
70
28
9
9
24
8,723
3,743
585
591
3,804
70
29
9
10
22
8,327
3,742
570
711
3,304
Psychiatric hospitals 11 2,750 12 2,790
Other hospital establishments 2 110 1 60
Hospitals with other institutions 7 1,530 9 3,525
Private hospitals 40 819 45 1 565
Dispensaries
For lung diseases
For dermato-venereological diseases
For oncological diseases
For psychic diseases
49
13
12
12
12
4,112
787
208
1,593
1,524
48
13
11
12
12
4,089
787
203
1,575
1,528
Source: National Health Information Center 
When NHIF first started reimbursing hospital services on July 1, 2001, the total 
sum amounted to 20% of the hospital budget. In 2007, the amount covers more 
than 90% of public hospital care expenditures. Payment takes place on the 
basis of activities performed under clinical pathways (CP). These contain explicit 
requirements and instructions for hospital diagnosis, treatment procedures and 
interventions – according to disease symptoms and according to the referral by the 
GP or specialist. The clinical pathway regulates the minimal period of hospitalization 
for each medical intervention or service included in the clinical pathway; the 
codes of the diseases and procedures according to the international classification 
of diseases;10 the minimum requirements for concluding a contract, including 
hospital wards, equipment and specialists; symptoms requiring hospitalization, 
including - treatment process, instructions concerning medical procedures, post-
hospital rehabilitation. Since the beginning of the reform, the clinical pathway 
coverage has expanded more than 10 times: from 30 CP comprising 158 diagnoses 
in 200, to 299 CP covering about 7,500 diagnoses in 2007.
The expanding health insurance coverage made it possible to discontinue state 
and municipal budget subsidies to most hospitals and dispensaries in 2006 and 
NHIF became the sole source of financing for the hospital sector. In 2006, the 
Ministry of Health took on the financing of psychiatric dispensaries and the 
activities under national health programs such as the transplantation program. In 
this manner, out of the total budget of the public hospital sector, which amounts 
to BGN 835 million, 740 million are covered by NHIF and 95 million, by the 
Ministry of Health budget.
In sum, the increased coverage and completed transition to a health-insurance 
system are the two chief positive outcomes of the reform in the health sector. 
Nevertheless, the main problems making the hospital sector susceptible to corrupt 
practices and extortion, for the most part related to the system of financing by 
the NHIF, have still not been overcome.
One of the most symptomatic indicators of the poor financial health of hospitals 
is the chronic problem with their indebtedness. The reasons are found in the 
inadequate financing of some costly clinical pathways by the NHIF, as well as 
the soft budget constraints until the end of 2005, which spurred a trend of 
overspending in the hospitals. The later were not motivated to reduce their debts 
to suppliers since they were confident that by the end of the year the Ministry 
of Health would cover their arrears. In most hospitals the transition to financing 
entirely by the Fund is expected to reduce such financial irresponsibility on their 
part. However, since under many clinical pathways the funding is less than the 
actual costs, such an effect is not certain. On the contrary, tension between 
hospitals and the NHIF may actually deepen. The hospital sector started the 
year of 2006 with BGN 200 million in unpaid debts, which amounted to 25% 
of its budget for the year. Toward the end of the year, about 160 million of 
this debt of university and district hospitals were quietly paid by the state, again 
with public vows by the Minister that this was happening for the very last time. 
In fact, there is still no agreement between the physicians and the state on a 
10 International classification of diseases, 10th version (ICD 10); and International Classification of 
Diseases, 9th clinical modification (ICD 9CM)
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lasting solution to this problem. In 2007, the parties could not even agree on 
the National Framework Agreement itself. Thus the negotiation mechanism was 
completely blocked and this opened the way for strikes and trade-union demands 
by doctors and nurses.
Of course, far more important than who will pay this debt is its origin and 
how to prevent its accrual in the future. The present system, based on clinical 
pathways, has significant shortcomings that impede the efficient use of the 
available resources. The assessment of some CP shows that there still exist certain 
elements aimed more at redistribution of funds and keeping the small hospitals 
alive, than covering real costs under the pathways. In this manner, certain basic 
pathways, essential to the majority of the hospitals, are overrated while other 
costly ones are underestimated and remain at the expense of the hospitals and 
the patients. This narrows down access to the more expensive hospital services 
and is conducive to corrupt practices.
There also exist a number of restrictions in the financing of clinical pathways that 
actually stimulate overspending. Thus, for instance, hospital expenditures can only 
be reimbursed if all of the procedures and interventions defined in the clinical 
pathway have been performed. Even if some of these become unnecessary in the 
course of the treatment, the hospital has to perform them or just report them so 
as not to lose payment for the activities actually carried out. This ”all-or-nothing’ 
principle leads to overspending or insufficient financing of clinical pathways to the 
detriment of the patients’ treatment. What is more, such risks force the hospitals 
to register the newly admitted patients under the more expensive clinical pathway, 
when possible, as a safety measure in case more costly interventions than initially 
expected have to be performed.
Last but not least, the clinical pathway based financing takes place within a 
framework agreed with NHIF and the respective hospital budget rather than on 
the basis of the real cost of medical service provision. This budget framework 
takes into account the capacity of individual hospital to admit patients under 
each CP agreed with NHIF. It is determined on the basis of reports on previous 
years, available facilities and experience. The hospitals are only allowed to exceed 
this budget by 5%.
These strict budget constraints have their justification. They are a preventive 
measure against overestimating expenditures and/or accumulating debts. They 
are aimed at ensuring equity, transparency and accountability in the allocation 
of funds to the hospitals. In the past, owing to differences in facilities and 
equipment, and in the level and quality of services, university hospitals used to 
get more money than district ones under the same CP. Besides, allegations were 
often heard that some select hospitals more easily have their debts paid in full 
by the Ministry of Health owing to connections with the political elite. Within 
this health economy of deficits and debts, it is the Ministry of Health, as the 
principal, that decides which hospital to save first and how much of its debts to 
pay, which in turn constitutes a lever for keeping their management in a state of 
dependence and subordination.
Since 2006, all hospitals have been receiving the same amounts for equivalent CP 
and, as mentioned above, are allowed to exceed this budget within up to 5%. 
The underlying idea is that NHIF finances the minimum level for a given CP. 
Should the quality and actual costs be higher, the difference has to be covered 
by the patient. In other words, patients have the choice between the minimal, 
NHIF-financed services or higher quality ones, at additional charge. This however, 
implies that each hospital should have a price list from which patients can find 
out what part of the clinical pathway is covered by NHIF and how much they 
have to pay themselves.
The problem with the underestimation of a number of clinical pathways by NHI 
is in turn causing problems with the inadequate remuneration of doctors and 
specialists, which became the chief reason for the strikes against health sector 
management in 2007. The poor motivation of medical workers and specialists in 
the hospitals and frustration with pay are equally the main source of corruption 
risks and practices. Unlike their colleagues in outpatient care, specialists in the 
hospital sector are hired by the hospitals. Their incomes and conditions of work 
depend on how well the hospital is managed. In the past years, the differences 
in pay between the outpatient and hospital sectors have increased considerably. 
In order to retain them in the hospitals, their managers tend to close their eyes 
to many overt and covert compromises with professional ethics and loyalty to the 
employer. Thus, for instance, many of the specialists working in the hospitals also 
have their own private practices. This mixing of public and private commitments 
is not always in the interest of patients and still less, of the employer.
So far, the attempts to address the problem with the inadequate pay in the 
hospital sector have been reduced to deconcentration of the management of 
public healthcare and the delegation of more rights and responsibilities to the 
executive bodies of the hospitals. The principal is always the state (Ministry of 
Health) or the municipality, which appoints the board of directors and endorses 
the framework for the collective bargaining agreement and pay levels. The board 
of directors has considerable freedom of action concerning the distribution of 
the  payroll fund. The national framework agreement guarantees that no less than 
40% of the funds granted by NHIF under the clinical pathways are allocated for 
payroll. There is no upper limit on the funds that may be distributed as salaries. 
In view of the inadequate payments under the clinical pathways, this system 
practically ties the hands of hospital management with regard to investments and 
the purchase of medications and services. The tax framework has a similar effect. 
Exempting hospital services from VAT in fact promotes labor-intensive activities 
and avoidance of the purchase of goods, services and equipment since the 
hospital is not entitled to VAT rebates for them. As a result, hospitals do not invest 
in fixed assets and with respect to current expenditures they tend to accumulate 
debts to the suppliers in the hope that in the end of the year the principal will 
bail them out. Or else they simply pass current expenditures on to the patients, 
charging them extra for medications and services.
In its present form, although nominally based on universal mandatory health 
insurance, the financing of the hospital sector is marked by pronounced elements 
of centralized distribution of healthcare funds. Progress has been made only in 
the sense that instead of the state distributing budget funds collected from taxes 
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among the hospitals, it is now the NHIF that allocates the money collected from 
the mandatory health insurance contributions. The hospitals are not motivated 
to provide more services than those agreed with NHIF since they may not get 
reimbursed for them. The system does not offer any incentives for seeking the 
optimal balance in allocating funds for payroll, medications and other inputs 
under each CP. In the absence of regulations on minimum expenditures for 
medications under CP reimbursable by NHIF, the system leaves room for abuse, 
since the hospital management may, under pressure from the doctors and nurses, 
allocate funds paid by NHIF for payroll and charge patients for medications that 
have actually been calculated into the cost of the CP.
Furthermore, the system provides no incentives for innovations and new 
technologies. There is no mechanism in place to take into account and encourage 
such expenditures in NHIF funding allocation. A similar situation is found with 
respect to improving the qualification of medical staff. With the bulk of the 
financing coming from NHIF and the lack of competition among hospital care 
providers, there is no means of compensation of such expenditures. On the 
contrary, when funds are granted under clinical pathways without making any 
distinctions between old and new equipment and technologies, any spending on 
investments and training in fact reduces the payroll fund. In other words, at this 
stage, investments in quality can only be paid back through unregulated payments 
by solvent patients directly to the treating physicians.
Finding themselves between the NHIF and the patients in their struggle for 
survival, the hospitals are trying to shift the financing burden onto either the 
Fund or the patients. Therefore, for the purposes of the present analysis, the 
corrupt and abusive practices in hospital care can be divided into two groups: 
those affecting the patients directly, by taking unregulated extra payments from 
them; and those affecting the patients indirectly, through the over-reporting of 
costs reimbursable by the Fund.
Typical instances of corruption in the hospital sector are bribes to secure hospital 
admission, purchase of medical supplies and medicines included in the cost of 
the clinical pathway, soliciting official donations to the hospital, extra charges for 
treatments and operations (Table 10).
It is a commonplace practice to force the insured patients to pay for medical 
supplies and medicines. The excuse typically cited is the lack of funds, insufficient 
financing from NHIF, etc. The patients are not in position to refuse and the 
doctors are ever less inclined to perceive such unregulated forcible payment as 
a corrupt practice. All too often, the reason is found in the fact that it is not an 
individual but a collective, semi-institutionalized, indirect instrument for increasing 
earnings, where personal inhibitions do not play any role. As already noted, in the 
present situation of shortage of funding for hospitals, the physicians’ salaries are 
safeguarded by the minimum threshold of expenditures, whereas patients’ rights 
are not protected by corresponding regulation of the expenditures for medications. 
Thus, with the increasing autonomy of hospitals and the shift of responsibility and 
pressure by physicians from the state to the hospital management, the latter are 
encouraged by the system to use the funds extended by NIHF for payroll on a 
priority basis, allocating whatever is left to expenditures for medications.
An even more institutionalized, if less prevalent, type of corruption pressure is to 
request a donation to the hospital from the patient. Such instances were reported 
by 4% of the respondents who had undergone hospital treatment in the survey 
conducted by ASSA-M in 2006.
A similar situation is found with respect to the widespread semi-institutionalized 
incidence of conflicts of interests. Each physician working in a hospital may also 
have a private practice as a specialist in the outpatient care sector. Most of the 
diagnostic equipment is found in the hospital sector. This is conducive to conflicts 
of interests: using hospital equipment for private examinations, referring patients 
to private offices. The sociological surveys show prevalence of these practices that 
run against neither any legal regulations nor any formal rules of ethics. On the 
contrary, the public increasingly tends to view them as a means for the good 
doctors to supplement their low salaries from the public sector. Thus the private 
practices of the specialists hired in the public sector make it possible for what would 
otherwise be unregulated payments to take place in accordance with the law. 
Naturally, the main corrupt practices primarily affect the active hospital treatment, 
surgical interventions, etc., where the additional direct payment to physicians 
and surgeons is the norm rather than the exception. In the public mind the 
justification for these practices is again the disparity between the official pay of 
physicians and the huge stake for the patient. Most of those who can afford it 
probably pay the money with hope and gratitude. Far more wronged are those 
who cannot afford to pay since it reduces their chances of getting timely and 
quality treatment even though they have health insurance coverage.
Even more revealing regarding the existence of corruption risks and practices is the 
”insider view”, i.e. the polls among doctors. By data of the Ministry of Health, about 
two-thirds of those interviewed confirm the existence of such practices of varying 
intensity (occasionally, often, all the time). The rates are highest in connection with 
birth delivery assistance (71%) and operations (68%). A considerable proportion 
reported having made unregulated payments for patient care (feeding, dressing, 
etc), as well as being solicited for donations upon admission to hospital (54.5%). 
Таble 10. Incidence of Corrupt Practices According to Those who have 
Undergone Hospital Treatment
(% of those who reported experiencing some of the situations listed during 
their hospitalization)
Have you bought supplies for your own use during your hospitalization? 28.2%
Have you bought medicines for your own use during your hospitalization? 27.8%
Have you made cash payments to the treating physician for an operation? 9.9%
Have you made cash payments in order to secure your hospital admission? 5.6%
Have you been asked to make an official financial donation to the hospital? 4.1%
Have you made cash payments to the treating physician for birth delivery? 1.3%
Source: ASSA-M 2006 N = 1028
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: FROM DIAGNOSTICS 
TO ACTIVE TREATMENT 
The deepening problems in the health sector in Bulgaria suggest that the health 
reform has strayed from the optimal solutions. The anticorruption measures in 
the health sector, particularly through ethical codes of conduct and hotlines, can 
hardly achieve any tangible results if the structural causes of corruption remain 
unaddressed. These causes are well-known and have been repeatedly reiterated 
in consultancy reports, electoral programs, and governance strategies over the past 
17 years. It is time to move on from diagnosing the problems in healthcare to 
active treatment through bolder structural measures. There exist several pressing 
challenges on which efforts should focus in the short and medium term.
First, the restructuring of the outpatient sector has still not been completed. The 
problems there are mainly those of access and coverage, as well as the need 
for optimal balance between financing on per-patient and per-activity basis. It 
is necessary to allocate more funds for prevention and prophylactics in order to 
reduce health risks and the load on the hospital sector. The solution is to expand 
the coverage and access to primary and particularly to specialized medical 
assistance, which should take in the at-risk social groups. The financial incentives 
intended to improve the care for these groups and attract medical staff to the 
remote and under-populated regions should be more substantial and better 
targeted. The efficiency and scope of the various national health programs should 
also be subject to a cost-benefit analysis.
Second – a great many of the problems of health service provision stem from 
the insufficient health insurance coverage. The very groups that are most exposed 
to health risks remain outside the reach of the insurance system. The state also 
needs to find a solution concerning those whose insurance rights have been 
suspended and to optimize the insurance collection system instead of penalizing 
those who are hardly responsible for their employers’ irregular payment of health-
insurance contributions.
Third – government policy and regulations in the field of medical products 
and medicine procurement needs to be thoroughly reassessed and restructured. 
There is a call for guarantees that the hospitals will actually spend the amounts 
budgeted for medicine expenditures under each clinical pathway as specified 
in the contract with NHIF so that the burden is not passed onto the insured. 
Currently the government sets a minimum payroll threshold but no such minimum 
threshold for medicine expenditures. The list of medicines reimbursable by NHIF 
in outpatient care should be negotiated in the most transparent manner possible, 
specifying the quantity and price of each medicine. It might be worthwhile to 
consider more active price monitoring and control over this oligopoly market.
Fourth – the most pressing problems in healthcare stem from the current impasse 
in the hospital sector. Hospital financing is still far from optimal and the funding 
advanced by NHIF tends to reflect more the choice and capacity of the providers 
than the real demand for hospital services by the insured, and still less, their 
actual cost. This calls for reassessment of the financial relations between the 
hospitals and NHIF, i.e. these relations should shift from a supply-driven, to a 
demand-driven model.
Last but not least, the role and responsibilities in health service provision of the 
private sector, as well as the nature of public-private partnership in this area 
need to be strategically reconsidered. The private sector is still held off from the 
market for health services. 
The last two issues are at the very heart of the problem with the blocked health 
reform in Bulgaria and are the key to restarting it in the short term. They are 
considered in more detail in the next two paragraphs.
5.1. CLINICAL PATHWAYS VS. DIAGNOSTICALLY RELATED GROUPS
Initially the adoption of clinical pathways was seen as a stepping stone to the 
internationally established system of diagnostically related groups (DRG). These 
are at the core of the so-called case-mix approach to hospital service financing. 
In fact, these are diagnoses and procedures that can be grouped together based 
on similar hospital resource requirements for the purposes of financing contracts 
between hospitals and health-insurance companies. The adoption of standardized 
DRGs is an important precondition for liberalization and competition in the 
market for health services. Otherwise each insurance company would have 
to implement its own clinical pathways or classification, which would impede 
competition and would increase hospital expenditures for concluding contracts 
with more than one company.
DRGs are further considered a superior means of hospital reimbursement for several 
reasons. This methodology sets hospital services within a standard framework for 
measuring the value of the output with a cost breakdown of the various inputs. 
For the system to work it is necessary to categorize all procedures and activities 
based on cost similarity. All expenditures are recorded and codified in accordance 
with this classification. The use of the same codes in cost breakdown and output 
value measurement ensures fairer comparative evaluation of the contribution of 
each unit to the patient treatment process and hence, improved planning and 
allocation of health-insurance funds. This makes DRGs a more flexible instrument 
for assessment and funding of the actual costs of medical services provided. As 
mentioned above, the actual treatment may deviate from the one laid down 
in the clinical pathway leading to possible discrepancy between actual costs 
and funding by NHIF. This motivates hospitals to admit patients under the most 
expensive CP so as to make sure they would not incur any losses. On the one 
hand, DRGs allow more accurate reporting and data bases on expenditures for 
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medical services and activities, and on the other hand, greater flexibility in the 
course of the treatment, which is not influenced by financial considerations. This 
reduces the variances between the actual costs and the costs reimbursed by 
NHIF.
In addition, CP-based contracts reflect the government-assessed capacity of the 
hospitals to provide medical services rather than the real demand for such 
services on the part of the consumers. Clinical pathways are an instrument more 
befitting a supply-side health economy, whereas DRGs bring the allocation of 
collected insurance funds closer to the real demand for medical services. It is 
regarded as a financing system based more on output than input values.
The evaluation and development phase of DRG introduction in Bulgaria began 
in 1993, i.e. 7 years before the outset of the transition to a health-insurance 
system. Many projects financed by USAID, the World Bank, and PHARE Program, 
provided the technical and expert resources needed for their adoption. Among the 
more notable results achieved over the next 12 years of intensive consultations, 
are the translation of the International Classification of Diseases, testing of the 
code system and the accounting software by an ever increasing number of pilot 
hospitals, developing comprehensive strategies, road maps and action plans for 
DRG introduction and training of trainers, accountants, and hospital managers, 
etc. Most of the work was done with the consultancy assistance of 3M of 
Switzerland. Ten years after their first contract in Bulgaria, 3M reported having 
compiled an observation database covering more than 640,000 patients in 40 
pilot hospitals; training of 1,585 trainers; a road map for DRG implementation in 
2005-2006. According to this program, by 2005 all of the hospitals should have 
been included in a DRG reporting and accounting system and the financing itself 
was to be introduced on a pilot basis; in 2006, the hospitals should have moved 
to DRG-based financing. After significant spending on technical assistance and 
training for the introduction of DRG, their implementation has been left outside 
the new health strategy for 2007-2012. There has been no explanation as to 
whether they have been rejected and why.
5.2. EQUITY, CONSUMER CHOICE, AND COMPETITION
So far the reforms in the health system have been centered largely on state-run 
compulsory health insurance. Little has been done to supplement the system 
with private insurance so as to allow consumers to at least partly take healthcare 
into their own hands. The state should primarily bear the responsibility for those 
in need, i.e. should ensure minimum health standards. Improved services are 
usually achieved through private insurance that allows greater consumer choice 
depending on individual ability to pay. This stimulates hospitals to compete for 
patients and to invest as well in capital-intensive clinical pathways. It is the 
obligation of the state to support private health insurance through appropriate 
incentives and a more favorable business environment. Currently, little efforts are 
made to promote additional private health insurance and taking out such a policy 
does not substantially reduce tax obligations or the rates of compulsory insurance 
contributions. Instead of increasing the latter, the government should consider 
whether it would not be more effective to encourage employers, the employed, 
and the self-employed, to take out additional health insurance. Naturally, such 
encouragement is hardly likely to have a great impact if the choice of additional 
insurance policies is again reduced to the state insurer – NHIF. It is necessary to 
promote private health-insurance services and improve public-private partnership 
in the health sector. Within such a health system it would be the responsibility 
of the state to control the insurance market and the market for medical services, 
as well as to provide adequate protection of consumer rights.
The broader choice of consumers with regard to service quality should be left up 
to the market rather than regulatory measures as is presently the case. Hospital 
revenues should hinge on the ability to attract patients with state-of-the-art 
technologies and good specialists instead of depending on the contract with the 
state monopoly holder in health insurance. This calls for various managerial skills 
on the part of the service providers, including investment project management 
and a changed attitude to the clients, as well as a clear-cut and well-defined 
price policy. The hospitals where costs are higher on account of better equipment 
and more highly paid specialists should make it perfectly clear to patients what 
part of the expenses would be covered by NHIF and what they would have 
to pay for themselves. This would stimulate the purchase of additional health-
insurance policies.
It equally implies new management that would assign higher priority to the 
patients rather than NHIF. Naturally, if the hospitals were rational business entities, 
to them the client would be the one who pays or on whose choice the size of 
their revenues depends. In the case of the Bulgarian system, the revenues depend 
more on the National Framework Agreement, i.e. on negotiations with NHIF, than 
on the choice of individual consumers. The way the system is designed to work 
still makes the state, as represented by NHIF, a far more important client to the 
hospitals than the patients who pay health-insurance contributions.
It is nevertheless worth noting that the potential of the market for health services, 
where competition is generally more limited, should not be overestimated. 
The years of budget financing of healthcare has brought about a deficit in 
project management skills and lack of consideration for the patients’ satisfaction. 
Moreover, it is not a market where one can rely too much on competition 
between service providers, particularly outside the big cities and university towns. 
The concept of consumer choice is hardly applicable to the larger part of the 
country, where patients have limited access to a single hospital or a single 
diagnostic center. Most hospitals, owing to their specialty or location, have a 
monopoly or oligopoly position in the market and can abuse of the possibilities 
to supplement NHIF financing with overpriced “extra services”. This is a market 
for services, meaning that labor costs account for a substantial portion of the 
end consumer price. It may exceed 50-60%. Under limited competition, price 
variations may reflect differences in pay, which may not result directly from 
differences in qualification, skills, and new technologies, but rather, from the 
possibility for hospitals to overprice their services owing to low elasticities of 
demand for hospital care (i.e. their opportunity to exploit the lack of consumer 
choice for securing higher incomes). It is precisely the flawed competition in this 
market that justifies the regulatory role and intervention of the state. But it by no 
means justifies the absence of political will for the government to create some 
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competition, to the extent possible. All the more that, compared to the current 
practices of under-the-table payments, the price list including all services is the 
better and more efficient instrument for optimizing the expenditures even in the 
absence of competition among the providers.
The advanced health systems are trying to find the optimal balance between 
consumer choice and market incentives, on the one hand, and the responsibilities 
of the state, on the other. As a rule the state takes on the obligation to ensure 
coverage and access for the groups most exposed to health risks. Secondly, it 
manages the implementation of the national health priorities, such as active 
prevention, immunization and prophylactic activities, the outcomes of which are 
monitored through the public health indicators. The responsibility for ensuring 
greater consumer choice should be assigned to the private sector. In the case of 
Bulgaria, this means more active involvement of the private sector in hospital care 
and individual and collective insurance plans. The state has control and regulator 
functions, both in the insurance market and in the market for healthcare services, 
but the present balance between incentives and sanctions should be changed in 
favor of better targeted and more effective incentives.
5.3. RISK MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
An important instrument of anticorruption policy would be a system of indicators 
making it possible to pinpoint and assess corruption risks, to identify measures 
to reduce them, as well as to subsequently evaluate the results achieved. The 
indicator matrix presented here is a general and open framework for risk 
monitoring and management that facilitates early warning of problem areas with 
high corruption risk, as well as the formulation of measures of prevention and 
counteraction. The indicators can also be used in follow-up evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the steps taken.
The system is based on information from two groups of sources. The first group 
comprises instruments for qualitative analysis and monitoring of the types of 
corrupt practices and corruption risk by sector. It draws information from:
• In-depth interviews with the specialists and supervisors in the respective 
structural units;
• Reports submitted by citizens through hotlines, anticorruption websites, 
ombudsman, and other channels for civic control and counteraction of 
corruption.
The information collected in this manner is processed and analyzed in order to 
provide the main parameters and objectives of the second part of the system: 
the quantitative indicators. These are structured in a way as to allow monitoring 
the dynamics of corrupt practices by type and area of occurrence. Some of 
them are the so-called soft data (sociological surveys) and unlike most corruption 
surveys, what is of central importance here is citizens’ shared personal experience 
concerning corruption in the health sector. A considerable part of corrupt and 
abusive practices, however, remain concealed from the patients. That is why it is 
equally important to conduct qualitative and quantitative surveys of health service 
providers, as well as of the units exercising control in the sector of health services 
and in hygiene-and-epidemiological inspection.
The system also contains diagnostic indicators of the risk of ”grand” (political) 
corruption in healthcare that involves high-level abuse of powers in the interest 
of particular investors or suppliers of equipment and medications, or of particular 
hospitals, for personal gain. They are not easy to measure but form an integral 
part of the overall assessment of corruption risk. Most are found in the sphere 
of public procurement and their detection therefore relies on such transparency 
and civic control instruments as the public procurement registry, the observation 
of the legal framework of party financing, lobbying, property declarations, and 
conflicts of interests involving health sector executives. Much of this framework 
has still not been finalized or is not being implemented effectively within the 
national legal system.
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CONCLUSION
The indices of the level and spread of corruption in Bulgaria show that it is 
growing in the healthcare sector. This stands out against the downward trend 
in corrupt practices in all other areas of public services (the so-called ”petty 
corruption”) over the past few years. This report identifies the reasons for this 
negative tendency and puts forward policy recommendations for counteraction.
The review of health reform achievements in Bulgaria indicates they are chiefly 
of the transition from budget financing to health insurance. This process is by and 
large completed. The problems, however, especially in the hospital sector, persist. 
And judging by public health indicators, they are even aggravating. Thus, the 
question of how and at what point the health reform deviated from the optimal 
solutions arises with particular urgency.
In the Bulgarian public debate, healthcare sector problems, including the high rate 
of corruption, are associated with the shortage of funds. The debate increasingly 
boils down to the inadequate pay of physicians.
The close analysis of the reform process, however, suggests that low pay is the 
outcome of poor management and incomplete reforms not the cause of all 
problems of the sector. Outpatient care suffers from insufficient coverage, reduced 
scope of preventive programs, and deep regional disparities. But the situation 
is worst in hospital care, which in addition to coverage and access problems, 
is saddled with outdated equipment and inadequate financing by the National 
Health Insurance Fund. As responsibility for the poor service quality is being 
passed onto the hospital management, the half-way measures that are still largely 
hinged on state-run health insurance have brought the reforms to a standstill.
In the context of partial reforms, anticorruption policy does not stand much of a 
chance. It is necessary to liberalize healthcare and to give both the employers and 
the insured the opportunity for broader choice of health plans by more insurers. 
Hospitals would then be able to work with more contractors and to compete for 
their patients. Naturally, competition in this market can hardly be expected to 
solve all problems. Although Bulgaria has the advantages of a small country and 
in the future will benefit from the positive aspects and competition in the internal 
EU market for health services, consumer choice is to some extent regionally 
limited. However, this can hardly be an argument in favor of a centralized 
insurance and hospital system but quite the opposite. Government health policy 
should combine social responsibilities with more competition among providers 
and greater consumer choice. Taking the reverse course of tightening regulations 
and control in the context of deficit and central distribution of the scant resources 
is a recipe for corruption and abuse at all levels of responsibility.
The fact that the key to reducing corruption in the hospital sector lies in bolder 
and more far-reaching structural measures to complete the reform does not imply 
that hospitals should put up with corruption while waiting for the government 
to bring the reform process to a successful end. The hospital management is 
the chief driver of restructuring and is largely responsible for the prevalence of 
corruption. There are a number of measures entirely within its competence and 
which can be undertaken as part of structural reforms. These include regulation 
of the additional payments; the refusal to pass the burden of current expenditures 
for medical supplies and medications onto the patients; fostering intolerance 
of unethical and unprofessional conduct with regard to patients, etc. The here-
outlined matrix for corruption risk assessment in Chapter 5 can be useful in 
developing anticorruption measures at all levels of governance.
Anticorruption policy needs to take into account several existing risks. The first 
one is the lack of political will. In this respect it is quite revealing that for more 
than a year now, the latest National Healthcare Strategy, which is saddled with 
the same symptoms of the half-way reforms to date, has neither been amended 
nor endorsed as it is. It essentially encapsulates the present state of the sector: 
lack of political will to reach a consensus; lack of administrative capacity to 
implement optimal instruments for improving service quality, consumer choice, 
and patient satisfaction.
One of the reasons is probably the fact that the health reform was not among 
Bulgaria’s accession priorities. There being no acquis communautaire in this area, 
it was relegated to the background in the negotiation process. The exceptions 
are the food and workplace safety regulations, as well as the environmental 
standards, which are of utmost importance for the protection of public health 
and, if implemented effectively, are likely to have a positive impact in the long 
term. As for outpatient and hospital care, these are European concerns largely 
in terms of the free movement of people rather than with regard to addressing 
the problems in the healthcare sector. This means that the greater opportunities 
for Bulgarian medical staff to work abroad may in the short term aggravate the 
shortage of specialists and physicians in some areas. In turn, this would be even 
more conducive to corruption, particularly if the public sector remains the chief 
hospital service provider. This is the second risk facing health policy in the short 
and medium term.
Last but not least, there is a significant risk of continuing along the lines of 
increased government intervention and control of the insurance and health service 
markets instead of seeking balanced solutions in terms of clearer regulation of the 
social responsibilities of the state, with consumer choice and quality improvement 
being entrusted to the private sector. Such an approach implies sharing the 
financing between the public insurance system and patients. It would not increase 
the burden already borne by the patients. It is high enough in international 
comparative terms even as it is. The problem is that it remains unregulated. 
The development of the market for health-insurance plans with the equitable 
participation of private and institutional insurers would most probably reduce 
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these costs and would bring out of the shadow economy a significant portion of 
the personal incomes of medical workers. In turn, this would make it possible to 
further ease the compulsory health-insurance burden.



